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COMMENTARY I VIEWPOINTS

$2.98- almost three times more. 1 It is time that Congress stepped forward to the aid of our young families
raising children and gave them a~ least as good .a d.eal
as their parents had under section 21 when 1t fust
entered the code. If Congress were to do that, the caps
of $2,400 and $4,800 would be adjusted up to $5,96~,
and $11,938, respectively. Phase-down of the cred1t
mechanism percentage would commence at $29,845
and would be phased down by 1 percent (but not below
20 percent) for each $5,969 or part thereof that income
rises above $29,845 with phase-down. stopping when
the credit percentage reached 20 percent at $83,569.
To get a good idea of just how ridiculous section 21
has become because of congressional failure to provide
inflation adjustment, consider this. Because the s~andard
deduction and personal and dependent deductions are
inflation adjusted, no one now qualifies for the 30 percent
(nonrefundable) credit because even a single parent with
one dependent child will not have any tax liability unt_il
income exceeds $12,050. 2 As a matter of fact, not only 1s
the 30 percent rate unavailable to any taxpayer because
of inflation but so also is the 29 percent rate.

Why, we might ask, has Congress chosen to ignore
those with small children, most of whom must work
to make ends meet for their families? Perhaps the
availability of section 129 childcare spending accounts,
which are superior for higher-income taxpayers, has
siphoned off the noisy and politically effective middle
and upper middle class for whom the spending of pretax dollars is preferable. Perhaps, budgetary concerns
until recently made Congress unwilling to inflation
adjust section 21. Curiously enough, such concerns did
not result in reticence to adjust the rate structure, the
standard deduction, personal and dependent deductions, and various phase-out mechanisms such as those
for itemized deductions, personal exclusions, and dependent deductions. Perhaps the political weight of conservative Christian groups, who think a mother's place
is in the home with her children, has made Congress
reluctant to come to the aid of working moms. Whatever
the excuses, they are unacceptable in the current era. It
is time for Congress to do its duty for working families
and adjust section 21 for inflation, making it as meaningful for the current generation as it was for its parents.
And while it is at it, Congress might as well also
adjust for inflation the $5,000 ~ap on child ca~e spending accounts provided by sectwn 129. That f1gure has
not been adjusted since section 129 was added to the
code in 1981. Inflation adjusted, that figure would now
stand at $9,240. It is time to act and give this generation
the same help in raising its children as its parents'
generation had when it raised them.
1
See The Bureau of Labor Statistics Web site at
(ftp:/ I .bls .gov /pub/ special.requests/ cpi/ cpiai.txt) (0~
tober 30, 2000). The inflation adjustments were made unhl
the month of September 2000, the last figure available at the
time this piece was authored.
2
Under Rev. Proc. 99-42, the standard deduction for a head
of household is $6,450 and the dependent deduction ~d ~he
personal exemption is set at $2,800 for tax years beg1nnmg
in 2000. See Rev. Proc. 99-42, 1999-46 IRB 568, Doc 1999-35283
(15 original pages), 1999 TNT 213-8.
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Tax Treatment of Defaulted Child
Support: The Better Approach
By Richard C.E. Beck

Richard C.E. Beck is a professor of law at New
York Law School. He wishes to thank his colleague Ann Thomas for her valuable suggestions.
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In these pages (July 24, 2000, p. 577), Professor
Donald Morris recommends that we all embrace H.R.
816, which would allow a "bad debt" deduction to
persons entitled to defaulted child support
(hereinafter, wives), and would impose a corresponding tax on obligors (hereinafter, husbands) for "discharge of indebtedness" (DOl) income. For the reas~ns
explained below, if the IRS should be c~arged w1th
collecting and distributing child support, 1t would be
far better to do it directly, as S. 2288 proposes, rather
than by creating artificial "income" and "deductions."
Professor Morris is quite right in thinking that
defaulted child support is an important issue. And he
is also right that allowing a bad debt deduction to the
wife (and imposing tax on DOl income on the husband)
is not a new idea. The scheme was urged as workable
under current law with very little statutory amendment by Professor William Klein in his 1990 article "Tax
Effects of Nonpayment of Child Support." 1 A bill substantially similar to H.R. 816 was introduced in 1993
by Senator Bumpers as the "Child Support Tax Equity
Act," but it failed to win support.
Professor Morris is aware that the issue of the wife's
bad debt deduction has been litigated and lost because
the courts have held that the wife has no basis in the
debt. He proposes a "theoretical" ground for justifying
the wife's basis in the debt, namely, that by paying for
the child's expenses herself, she creates a "constructive
loan" to the husband. The same idea was suggested
earlier by Professor Klein. I disagree with the analysis
as it applies to the bad debt de~uction. But mos.t of al.l,
and quite apart from the distortions of tax d<;>ctrme t_lus
bad debt/DOl income scheme would reqmre, I thmk
the effort is misguided and would do more harm than
good.
As for the bad debt deduction, the courts have long
held that the wife has no basis in the debt and that it
is therefore not deductible. A bad debt is a loss, and in
the memorable phrase of the Board of Tax Appeals,
"you can't lose what you never had." 2 I think this is
correct. Senator Bumpers presented his 1993 bill as if
it were simply a matter of applying curre~t section 166
fairly and consistently to everyone. If busmessmen can
1

45(2) Tax Law Rev. 259 (Winter 1990) .
,
Long v. Commissioner, 35 BTA 479, 482 (1937), aff d 96 ~.2d
270 (9th Cir. 1938); cert. den. 30:5 U.S. 616. (1938) (uncollect~ble
maintenance obligations for w1fe and children not deductible
as bad debt).
2
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deduct bad debts, his pitch ran, why not needy women
as well? But not all businessmen can deduct bad debts.
Those on the cash method who are owed receivables
such as overdue rents, doctor's or attorney's fees, and
so on cannot deduct them for the same reason as the
disappointed wife, namely, lack of basis.
Professor Morris thinks that by paying for the
child's expenses, the wife might be deemed to obtain
a basis in the debt for unpaid child support. This
analysis overlooks some problems. First, the wife's
living expenses are just that, living expenses, and it is
difficult to see how they can be capitalized into the
basis of anything. Next, assuming the expenditures can
be capitalized at all, it is far from clear how they could
be capitalized into the basis of the debt. The custodial
parent ha~ an obligation to support her children which
is completely independent of the husband's fixeddollar obligation. No matter how much of her own
money she spends on the children, the husband's
obligation remains unaffected.3
Consider an analogy. If uninsured Tortfeasor totals
Victim's car and Victim obtains a worthless judgment
debt of $20,000, Victim cannot deduct the debt for lack
of basis. Does anything change if Victim replaces the
car by investing $20,000 of his own? I think not. Victim
obtains basis in the car, not in the debt, and his deduction is limited to the allowable personal casualty loss,
if any. If Victim did obtain basis in the debt, he would
enjoy two deductions for the same loss. Also, if Professor Morris's imputed basis works, the wife should logically obtain basis only for the amounts she actually
spends on the children, not for the face amount she is
owed. This would present very inconvenient problems
of administration and record keeping, as well as difficult questions of allocation. How much of the cost of
Mom's car should be allocated to child care expense?
Congress wisely ended such problems in the area of
child exemptions when it enacted section 152(e) in
1984.
One may disagree about the basis issue. But just
about every other aspect of the bad debt/DOl scheme
suffers similar problems or worse, and simply cannot
be fit into the structure of current law. H.R. 816 seems
to acknowledge this by offering explicit statutory
amendment at every tum. For example, all other debts
must be worthless to be deductible, but the bill would
change this requirement for child support by requiring
only that the debt be overdue by a full year. The normal
treatment of a nonbusiness bad debt as a short-term
capital loss is inconvenient, and so the proposed
3
The analysis would be different if the wife were forced
to overpay her share of a joint obligation, and her payment
freed the husband from his debt. Then if the wife is entitled
to contribution from the husband and cannot collect, she
should be allowed a bad debt deduction and he should incur
DOl income. See Beck, "The Deductibility of a Worthless
Right to Contribution for Joint Income Taxes: The Mistaken
Line of Cases Under Rude v. .Commissioner," 9(2) Va . Tax Rev.
313 (1989). Conceivably the same analysis might apply to
child support as well in situations where the husband is
obligated to pay for specific items of support, say private
school tuition, and the wife is forced to pay the item instead.
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statute makes it an ordinary deduction. This too is
inconvenient for nonitemizers, so the bill makes it an
above-the-line deduction. By the time we are done
there is little left that resembles a nonbusiness bad debt
deduction, and no reason at all to shoehorn the new
provisions into section 166. It would be less confusing
to create, say, a new section 161 "Deduction for Overdue Child Support."
On the husband's side, the resemblance between the
proposed law and current doctrine is still more
tenuous. First, just as the "worthless" debt need not be
worthless, the "discharged" debt need not actually be
discharged to trigger income. It need only remain unpaid for more than a year. In all probability, none of
the qualifying debts will have been discharged.
Second, a child support debt is not the sort of obligation which creates DOl income in the first place. Ever
since Rail Joint,4 it is an essential element of DOl income
that the obligor must have originally borrowed something. But the husband never received any loan
proceeds. It is not enough merely to be freed of an
obligation. Tortfeasor in the above hypothetical cannot
be subject to DOl income for the same reason as the
child support obligor. He never received anything that
leaves him wealthier when the debt is canceled. So this
too must be specially provided for in the proposed
legislation, which would apply solely to debts for .:hild
support. Here again I think it would be better to create
a new section of the code, rather than to amend section
108 where it does not belong.
Unfortunately, the practical problems of the bill are
likely to be even more troublesome than the theoretical
ones. Consider what happens when the husband does
finally catch up and pay the child support in a later
year. The wife's deduction must now be reversed, and
she must take the previously deducted amount into
income under section 111. Quite apart from the
problems of record keeping this will cause, the section
111 treatment may prove a painful boomerang.
Divorcees are often at their most impecunious immediately after divorce, and generally recover economically only over time. A common result will be that
the wife will enjoy her deduction only in the 15 percent
bracket, but she will have to take the same amount into
income in a later year in the 28 percent bracket. This
result is obviously undesirable.
Fairness would seem to require that the husband's
catchup support payments should entitle him _to an
offsetting deduction in order to reverse the earlier DOl
tax treatment. Unfortunately there is no way to get
there from here under anything resembling current
law. H.R. 816 comes to the rescue by simply creating a
deduction by fiat . Note that there is no need for such
a rule in any other DOl situation, because all other
debts must be discharged before they can create DOl,
and so will never be paid (or repaid).

4
Rail Joint Co. v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1277 (1931), aff'd
61 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.1932)(repurchase of bonds for less than
par does not give rise to DOl income where bonds originally
issued as dividends and nothing was borrowed).
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These adjustments in later years will have to be
made for state and local taxes as well where the state
follows the federal income tax rules.
There are a number of arbitrary cutoffs in the bill
that seem poorly thought out. Why, for example,
should the deduction be denied to wives whose adjusted gross income exceeds $50,000? And why should
the deduction be limited to $10,000 per child per year?
No such limits apparently apply to the husband's DOl
income.
A possible answer lies in one of the most peculiar
aspects of the bill. Its authors think it will raise revenue. This revenue is earmarked in the bill for repayment of the national debt. The expected profit results
from the belief that husbands will generally be taxed
on their DOl income at 28 percent or higher, whereas
wives will take deductions at 15 percent (if at all). I am
skeptical about the profit estimate, but if it turns out
to be true, it will be a very bad thing. Do we really
want to take child support from the mouths of babes
to pay down the national debt?
The ultimate purpose of this Rube Goldberg tax bill
is apparently simply to collect some child support from
husbands and pay it to wives. It is cast as a tax bill,
but it makes no sense as one, and despite all the
deemed this and constructive that, the proposed tax
rules do not and cannot arrive at results that are "correct" in any recognizable tax sense. So if the bill has
any merit at all, it can only be as a tool for the collection
of child support.
But if it seems desirable as a policy matter for the
IRS to collect child support, it should be done directly.
Nothing is gained and much is lost by distorting the
tax rules to collect child support as taxes on DOl, and
to distribute it again in the form of a bad debt deduction. If the IRS collected child support from the husband and distributed it to the wife without the pretense
that it involved taxes at all, the proposal would be far
simpler and more effective.
For the wives who are most in need of help, H.R.
816 provides nothing because they probably do not pay
taxes in the first place and have no use for the "bad
debt" deduction. A wife with two children can earn up
to about $25,500 before incurring any income tax
liability at alP Thus she would receive nothing even
if the IRS manages to collect some of her support in
the form of "taxes" on "DOl" from the husband. This
seems unconscionable.
For women with higher incomes, the benefits are
still very small and highly unlikely to make much real

difference in children's lives. If the average amount of
child support paid per year is $3,795,6 a wife would
need nearly $29,000 of income to be able to deduct it
in full, and at 15 percent, the deduction would generate
only $569 in tax reduction, a benefit that increases her
net income after tax by less than 2 percent. This seems
hardly worth the trouble, and one suspects the real
beneficiary will be H & R Block.
If the IRS can find the husbands and get them to pay
support as "taxes," there is no reason to collect only 28
percent of the support. Why not just collect it all, and
pay it all over to the wives? (Without the IRS charging
a 50 percent profit to pay down the national debt.) The
pretense of collecting taxes rather than child support
means that the support still has to be collected all over
again through some other agency, after which the "tax"
transactions must be undone with the absurd corrective adjustments proposed under the bill. In short, H.R.
816 would be very complicated, wasteful, and
counterproductive. A much more promising proposal
would be for the IRS simply to collect and distribute
child support as child support, which S. 2288 would
do.
At present, the IRS already does collect some child
support through the refund intercept program, without
pretending it is a tax, and the program appears to be
reasonably successful. One frequent difficulty with the
interception regime is caused by the joint return. If the
husband has remarried and files jointly with his second
wife, some of the intercepted refund may belong to her.
. Because she does not owe the husband's child support
she has a right to demand and receive her share of the
refund. This creates complications, but at least it is fair
in principle.
Consider what would happen in the same scenario
under the bad debt/DOl scheme of H.R. 816. If the DOl
is "income," then the second wife filing jointly will be
personally liable for the "tax" under section 6013(d).
This is obviously indefensible.
Many other countries already go farther than our
intercept program and use their tax systems to collect
child support directly through the same wage withholding as the income tax. Australia and New
Zealand have been doing so for some years. That is
what S. 2288 would do. I do not know whether the
IRS would be able to collect support more efficiently
than the current (partially federalized) system of enforcement, which already makes use of wage withholding. But it is certainly worth considering, and
H.R. 816 is not.

5
For 1999, a woman with two children filing as head of
household would need to earn more than $14,600 before incurring any income tax liability under the tables, without
taking into account the Earned Income Tax Credit worth up
to $3,556 and the new Child Tax Credit of $1,000. Taking the
credits into account, if the taxpayer has $25,500 of earned
income, her entire tax of $1,635 from the tables will be
credited by the EITC ($639) and CTC ($1,000), and she will
have no use for the deduction.

6
According to Geraldine Spencer, president of the Association for Children for Enforcement of Support, quoted in BNA
Daily Tax Report, Sept. 27, 2000, at G-4.
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